As this book makes clear, current use of data structures such as frames, scripts, and stereotypes in psychology, artificial intelligence, and all the other disciplines now grouped together as Cognitive Science develop ideas already explored by Husserl who believed that the analysis of mental representations was the proper subject of philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines that deal with the mind. This new anthology will serve as an ideal introduction to phenomenology for analytic philosophers, both as a text and as the (...) single most useful source book on Husserl for cognitive scientists. An MIT Press/Bradford Book. (shrink)

The content of this paper is an elaboration of Hubert L. Dreyfus’s philosophical critique of Artificial Intelligence (AI), computers and the internet. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1929-2017) is Ua SA philosopher and alumni of Harvard University who teach at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of California, Berkeley. He is a phenomenological philosopher who criticize computer researchers and the artificial intelligence community. In 1965, Dreyfus wrote an article for Rand Corporation titled “Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence” which criticizes (...) the masterminds of Artificial Intelligence. Dreyfus also criticized the order of computers via two books: (1) What Computers Can’t Do (1972) and (2) What Computers Stills Can’t Do (1992). He favored human intuition rather than the computer logic in his book Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (1986). In 2001, Dreyfus wrote a book On the Internet, which considers the prominent phenomenon in the recent Industry 4.0. By elaborating on Dreyfus’s philosophy on the computer, artificial intelligence, and the internet, we will know the philosophical debate on the result of industry 3.0 (computer and artificial intelligence) and 4.0 (artificial intelligence and internet). Moreover, we will know the relation between humans and those industrial products. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive third”) (...) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.” . (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive third”) (...) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.”. (shrink)

Περιεχόμενα ΜΕΡΟΣ Α΄ Πραγματικότητα και δυνητικότητα στο πεδίο του ψηφιακού: Ζητήματα οντολογίας και γνωσιοθεωρίας 1.1 Αλέξανδρος Σχισμένος, Γιάννης Περπερίδης Για τον Luciano Floridi και την «πληροφοριακή σφαίρα» 1.2 Luciano Floridi Αυτοκατανόηση. οι τέσσερις Επαναστάσεις (μετάφραση: Αλέξανδρος Σχισμένος, Γιάννης Περπερίδης) 2.1 Κωνσταντίνος Φιλιππάκης Μια απόπειρα αναθεώρησης του «νεωτερικού συντάγματος» υπό «νεοκυβερνητική» έποψη 2.2 Iain Grant Θεωρίες της κυβερνοκουλτούρας (μετάφραση: Κωνσταντίνος Φιλιππάκης) 3.1 Στέφανος Ρέγκας Characteristica digitalis: ο Pierre Lévy και η τυποποίηση του νοήματος 3.2 Pierre Lévy Η φύση της πληροφορίας (μετάφραση: (...) Στέφανος Ρέγκας) 4.1 Ελένη Σπυράκου Η πληροφορία ως πραγματικότητα: δυνατότητες και όρια μιας διερώτησης 4.2 Albert Borgmann Δυνητικότητα και ασάφεια (μετάφραση: Ελένη Σπυράκου) 5.1 Μαριάνθη-Ελένη Διαμαντοπούλου Κατ’ εικόνα και ομοίωση: μια ανδρική οντολογία του κυβερνοχώρου 5.2 Michael Heim Η ερωτική οντολογία του κυβερνοχώρου (μετάφραση: Μαριάνθη-Ελένη Διαμαντοπούλου) 6.1 Γιώργος Περτσάς Μεταξύ αμφισημίας και παραδοξότητας: για την οντολογία των ψηφιακών τεχνουργημάτων 6.2 Jannis Kallinikos, Aleksi Aaltonen, Attila Marton Η αμφίσημη οντολογία των ψηφιακών τεχνουργημάτων (μετάφραση: Γιώργος Περτσάς) ΜΕΡΟΣ Β΄ Σώματα, ταυτότητες, εμπειρίες στο πεδίο του ψηφιακού: Ζητήματα φιλοσοφικής ανθρωπολογίας 1.1 Ιωάννης-Φίλιππος Φεϊζίδης Don Ihde: ο άνθρωπος ανάμεσα στις μηχανές 1.2 Don Ihde Σώματα, δυνητικά σώματα και τεχνολογία (μετάφραση: Ιωάννης-Φίλιππος Φεϊζίδης) 2.1 Ιωάννης-Φίλιππος Φεϊζίδης Stéphane Vial: προς μία αυτοτελή φιλοσοφία της τεχνολογίας 2.2 Stéphane Vial Βλέπειν και αντιλαμβάνεσθαι στην ψηφιακή εποχή: θεωρία της οντοφάνειας (μετάφραση: Ιωάννης-Φίλιππος Φεϊζίδης) 3.1 Αλέξανδρος Σχισμένος Υποκείμενο και σώμα στην ψηφιακή εποχή 3.2 Katherine N. Hayles Η υλικότητα της πληροφορίας (μετάφραση: Αλέξανδρος Σχισμένος) 4.1 Μαριάνθη-Ελένη Διαμαντοπούλου Μια ευθεία γραμμή προς το μάτριξ, πολλές αλλόκοτες γραμμές προς την ελευθερία 4.2 Sadie Plant Περί Μάτριξ: κυβερνοφεμινιστικές προσομοιώσεις (μετάφραση: Μαριάνθη-Ελένη Διαμαντοπούλου) 5.1 Βιβή Ζάψα Από τον Homo digitalis στον Homo qubitalis: μια σύντομη εισαγωγή 5.2 Rafael Capurro Πέραν της πληροφοριακής σφαίρας (μετάφραση: Βιβή Ζάψα) 6.1 Γιάννης Νίνος Ψηφιακότητα και κρίση παραδειγμάτων 6.2 Μανώλης Πατηνιώτης Προσωπική ταυτότητα και δυνητικότητα: η επανεπινόηση του εαυτού σε ψηφιακά περιβάλλοντα ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ΄ Ατομικές και συλλογικές επιτελέσεις στο πεδίο του ψηφιακού: Ζητήματα πολιτικής φιλοσοφίας και κοινωνικής θεωρίας 1.1 Γιώργος Καφφέζας Langdon Winner: ένας κριτικός προφήτης στις αρχές της ψηφιακής επανάστασης 1.2 Langdon Winner Ο μύθος της πληροφορίας (μετάφραση: Γιώργος Καφφέζας) 2.1 Γιάννης Κτενάς, Γιώργος Περτσάς Βίωμα και δέσμευση στην ψηφιακή εποχή: Ο Hubert Dreyfus συναντά τον Kierkegaard σε μια κριτική του διαδικτύου 2.2 Hubert L. Dreyfus Ο μηδενισμός στη λεωφόρο της πληροφορίας: η ανωνυμία ενάντια στη δέσμευση σήμερα (μετάφραση: Γιάννης Κτενάς) 3.1 Γιάννης Περπερίδης Paidia, Ludus και ψηφιακές τεχνολογίες: η ανατρεπτικότητα του παίζειν και ο εκδημοκρατισμός της τεχνολογίας 3.2 Sara M. Grimes, Andrew Feenberg Εξορθολογίζοντας το παίζειν: μία κριτική θεωρία του ψηφιακού παιχνιδιού (μετάφραση: Γιάννης Περπερίδης) 4.1 Ειρήνη Φωλίνα, Γιάννης Περπερίδης Μετα-φαινομενολογία και ψηφιακές τεχνολογίες: μία απόπειρα εισαγωγής στο έργο του Mark Coeckelbergh 4.2 Mark Coeckelbergh Τεχνολογία, αφήγηση, και επιτέλεση στο κοινωνικό θέατρο: πώς οι ψηφιακές τεχνολογίες γράφουν, σκηνοθετούν, και οργανώνουν τις αφηγηματικές και χρονικές δομές της κοινωνικής μας ύπαρξης (μετάφραση: Ειρήνη Φωλίνα, Γιάννης Περπερίδης) 5.1 Μαρία Μούρτου-Παραδεισοπούλου, Παναγιώτης Διδάχος, Γιάννης Περπερίδης Το πολιτικό πρόταγμα πίσω από τα ψηφιακά κοινά 5.2 Αλέξανδρος Κιουπκιολής Τα ψηφιακά κοινά, το πολιτικό και η κοινωνική αλλαγή: προς μια ολοκληρωμένη στρατηγική αντι-ηγεμονίας που προάγει τα κοινά (μετάφραση: Μαρία Μούρτου-Παραδεισοπούλου, Παναγιώτης Διδάχος) Οι συντελεστές του τόμου Ευρετήριο ονομάτων. (shrink)

Invited papers from PT-AI 2011. - Vincent C. Müller: Introduction: Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence - Nick Bostrom: The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents - Hubert L. Dreyfus: A History of First Step Fallacies - Antoni Gomila, David Travieso and Lorena Lobo: Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic - J. Kevin O'Regan: How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels - Oron Shagrir: Computation, Implementation, Cognition.

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

I analyze the meaning of mass in Newtonian mechanics. First, I explain the notion of primitive ontology, which was originally introduced in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Then I examine the two common interpretations of mass: mass as a measure of the quantity of matter and mass as a dynamical property. I claim that the former is ill-defined, and the latter is only plausible with respect to a metaphysical interpretation of laws of nature. I explore the following options for the (...) status of laws: Humeanism, primitivism about laws, dispositionalism, and ontic structural realism. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

the purpose of this paper is to o er a logico‐philosophical critical overview of the theory of multiple realities (tWr). the paper is divided into three sections. In the rst section I present a brief history of the development of some ideas, which combined together form the conceptual amework of the theory in question, whose main thesis is that there is more than one reality. In the second part I present (and try to address) some interpretations of tWr, which can (...) be described as: ontological; epistemological; esthetical; logical ad mixed interpretations. When do‐ ing so, a special emphasis is laid on the presentation of an explication of tWr based on theory of models, an explication authored by teresa Kostyrko. this explication rests on a conditional recognition of the particular ‘realities’ of Chwistek’s theory as proper models (i.e. those, which ful ll the condition of the identity of meaning of theory’s fundamental notions) of the theories of reality, with the provision that such models are indeed constructible. In the last section of my paper I propose a preliminary appraisal of the tWr as well as a way to reengineer this theory in order to avoid some of its di culties. By appealing to Kostyrko’s idea on one hand and the spirit Quinean ontological relativism on the other, I wish to argue as follows: ‘reality’ is the name of the set comprising all meanings of the term ‘reality’; under particular conditions these meanings can be arranged in a theory, which posseses a proper model (scienti c discourse, some forms of the common talk); model proper designate by de nition classes of objects, which we regard as existent on the grounds of a given theory. the above set of theses forms the core of a concept, which I propose to call the ‘manifold reality’ in order to di erentiate it om tWr, the development of which theory it is, as well as its modi cation towards a new kind of ontology. (shrink)

There is not much of a consensus on almost anything about quantum mechanics. I take it, however, that the minimum consensus is that "although quantum mechanics is empirically successful, quantum mechanics is hard to understand." Quantum mechanics, in the way it is presented in most textbooks, does indeed not provide a clear picture of reality that would make it a theory to be understood. In her new book, "The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics," Alyssa Ney (...) tries to make this blurry picture of reality more precise, even if this picture will turn out to be heterodox and unfamiliar. (shrink)

We show that in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory of classical electrodynamics most initial values for fields and particles lead to an ill-defined dynamics, as they exhibit singularities or discontinuities along light-cones. This phenomenon suggests that the Maxwell equations and the Lorentz force law ought rather to be read as a system of delay differential equations, that is, differential equations that relate a function and its derivatives at different times. This mathematical reformulation, however, leads to physical and philosophical consequences for the ontological (...) status of the electromagnetic field. In particular, fields cannot be taken as independent degrees of freedom, which suggests that one should not add them to the ontology. (shrink)

The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the (...) law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. (shrink)

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and (...) nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics. (shrink)

This is the BJPS Short Read version of the article When Fields Are Not Degrees of Freedom. In our article, Vera Hartenstein and I show that the world of classical electromagnetism might differ radically from the one we see in physics textbooks and experience day-to-day. First, light may not exist; second, the laws of electromagnetism are either incomplete or completely different; and, third, the mathematics needed to make exact calculations with these novel laws is in early development and not part (...) of the general mathematics curriculum at colleges and universities. (shrink)

The Generalized Poisson Distribution (GPD) adds an extra parameter to the usual Poisson distribution. This parameter induces a loss of homogeneity in the stochastic processes modeled by the distribution. Thus, the generalized distribution becomes an useful model for counting processes where the occurrence of events is not homogeneous. This model creates the need for an inferential procedure, to test for the value of this extra parameter. The FBST (Full Bayesian Significance Test) is a Bayesian hypotheses test procedure, capable of providing (...) an evidence measure on sharp hypotheses (where the dimension of the parametric space under the null hypotheses is smaller than that of the full parametric space). The goal of this work is study the empirical properties of the FBST for testing the nullity of extra parameter of the generalized Poisson distribution. Numerical experiments show a better performance of FBST with respect to the classical likelihood ratio test, and suggest that FBST is an efficient and robust tool for this application. (shrink)

What is the meaning of the wave-function? After almost 100 years since the inception of quantum mechanics, is it still possible to say something new on what the wave-function is supposed to be? Yes, it is. And Shan Gao managed to do so with his newest book. Here we learn what contemporary physicists and philosophers think about the wave-function; we learn about the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory, the gravity-induced collapse theory by Roger Penrose, and the famous PBR (...) theorem; we learn about Schrödinger's original idea that the wave-function represents charge densities; we learn about the notorious measurement problem and its consequences; we learn about the challenges to find a consistent relativistic quantum theory; and we learn, of course, Gao's own suggestion for the status of the wave-function. Above all, Gao shows us the significance of protective measurements for our search of the ontology of quantum mechanics. Still not widely recognized among physicists and philosophers, protective measurements let us look deeper into quantum mechanics. For Gao this is the main tool to settle the issue on the ontological status of the wave-function: the wave-function is real because one can measure it. (shrink)

In their paper "How Fundamental Physics represents Causality", Andreas Bartels and Daniel Wohlfarth maintain that there is place for causality in General Relativity. Their argument contains two steps: First they show that there are time-asymmetric models in General Relativity, then they claim to derive that two events are causally connected if and only if there is a time-asymmetric energy flow from one event to the other. In our comment we first give a short summary of their paper followed by a (...) section introducing and pondering different conceptions of causation since Bartels and Wohlfarth don’t explicitly declare which notion of causation they build on in the paper. In order to analyze their argument in detail we formalize their crucial step in logical terms. This helps to pose the question whether their proposed derivation is not just a definition in a more precise way. (shrink)

Je cherche à explorer comment l'expérience de la temporalité est multiforme et fortement perturbée à l'époque de la pandémie Covid-19 et des politiques de confinement, générant une expérience d'hétérochronie, qui remet en question notre rapport à la vie.

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is (...) in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs. (shrink)

Le but de ce texte est de mettre en évidence les équi­valences entre la façon dont le concept de conatus résout, dans l'Éthique, le problème de l'unité modale complexe. en rendant consis­tant le concept de chose singulière en tant que celle-ci doit être consi­dérée comme un légitime sujet d'attribution d'états, et la façon dont ce même concept dessine le rapport cognitif de l'esprit avec lui-même, rapport par lequel l'esprit se saisit comme sujet de ses états et qui ca­ractérise la notion (...) moderne de subjectivité. Ainsi, en éclairant cet as­pect du concept spinoziste de chose singulière. on comprendra aussi, de façon indirecte, l'une des conditions par lesquelles les choses peuvent, dans la doctrine spinoziste, devenir des objets ou des signes pour la connaissance humaine. (shrink)

The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive (...) stuff. We show that such properties can be local, as well as holistic, and discuss two metaphysical options to conceive them, namely, Humeanism and modal realism in the guise of dispositionalism. 1 Introduction2 Primitive Ontology: Primitive Stuff3 The Physics of Matter as Primitive Stuff4 The Humean Best System Analysis of the Dynamical Variables5 Modal Realism about the Dynamical Variables6 Conclusion. (shrink)

Rājadhamma is a list of ten royal virtues or duties that occurs in the jātaka tales and that has been influential in Southeast Asian Buddhist political thought. Like pre-modern political thought in Europe—that is, thought before the Sattelzeit—Buddhist political thought lacks a concept of the “state” and is concerned with kings and similar rulers. Here I propose a modernized interpretation of rājadhamma as virtues/duties of the state.

In this essay I explore the encounter between religion and music via ideas taken from Olivier Messiaen. I first present his categorization of music and the concepts of sound-colour and dazzlement as the 'directional meaning' of music. I then show how Messiaen relates this to the phenomena of natural resonance and afterimages, and based on this, I present-via Goethe and Rudolf Steiner-the notion of an etheric, evanescent or incorporeal matter. This understanding and experience of matter is then brought to bear (...) on music. In this context the notion of a 'religious experience' can be understood as both referring to content and sentiment related to a religious belief, and, in a more general sense of 'religare' (to bind), as a deeper bond with the material-temporal flow of nature. This gives way to a Johannine vision of Messiaen's musical thinking where the creative-sounding Logos or 'word' is both spirit and matter, and where music may represent a potential awakening to this reality. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...) would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. This suggests we should reject our ordinary conception of how to make this life-changing decision, and raises general questions about how to rationally approach important life choices. (shrink)

Galileo’s Error is a superlative work of public philosophy, particularly as a way of introducing modern academic panpsychism to a broader audience. In this commentary, I reflect on an issue that is prominent, though often with different background concerns, in both academic and popular discourse: what it means to be ‘scientific’ or ‘unscientific’. Panpsychism is not itself a scientific hypothesis, but neither is it (as critics sometimes claim) in conflict with science. Indeed, Goff argues, and I agree, that panpsychism is (...) an eminently scientific worldview, in the sense of a way of viewing reality that accords with and embraces what science reveals. But what exactly it means to ‘accord with and embrace’ science is disputed; this paper tries to untangle some of the threads. (shrink)

The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.

In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of (...) the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome .. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 165-189, May 2022. It is generally acknowledged that a certain amount of state intervention in health and health care is needed to address the significant market failures in these sectors; however, it is also thought that the primary rationale for state involvement in health must lie elsewhere, for example in an egalitarian commitment to equalizing access to health care for all citizens. This paper argues that a complete theory of justice in (...) health can be derived from a commitment to correcting market failure, or in other words promoting Pareto-efficiency, in the domain of health. This approach can address familiar problems around access to care, as well as problems related to resource allocation and rationing, the control of health care costs, and the foundations of public health. Egalitarian theories of justice in health cannot make sense of the depth and pervasiveness of state involvement in health and health care; only a theory rooted in the need to correct market failure can. (shrink)

'A Differential Play of Forces' is a study of transcendental empiricism in musical contexts. It presents a reading of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosophical apparatus and explores how music can be thought of as functioning in the operation Deleuze terms transcendental empiricism. Central to transcendental empiricism is the idea of an encounter with intensive difference and the consequent experience of intensive and virtual forces. The thesis sets out to explore this idea in three interwoven steps. First, it develops transcendental (...) empiricism as a philosophical framework, expounding central notions related to time and aesthetic experience. In the context of this philosophical apparatus, music is then discussed as an encounter with intensity and what this may entail for our understanding of musical experience and its potential. The third part of the thesis explores the idea of experiencing intensive forces through music in the thinking and poietic of three composers of the twentieth century: Arnold Schönberg, Olivier Messiaen and Giacinto Scelsi. The thesis develops three ‘images of thought’ corresponding, respectively, to the composers’ expressed theoretical ideas, identifying central concepts from Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. A mutual illumination of ideas about music and transcendental empiricism is thus presented, pointing towards a possible convergence between theory and practice, thinking and aesthetic experience as a differential play of intensive forces. (shrink)

L’HÉRITAGE FAMILIAL...; Traduit de The Kingfisher Story Collection.

I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...) prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves. (shrink)